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Abstract 
One of the major challenges facing modern-day secular states is the issue of social 
integration. The issue discussed in this article is how it is possible to arrive at 
unifying values in a multicultural society that is characterised by secularisation and 
disintegration of the Christian hegemony of former times on the one hand and by the 
emergence of cultural and religious diversity on the other. The analysis is centred 
around Norwegian Kindergarten, which represent a key institution for 
communicating values and morals in contemporary Norwegian society. The objects 
clause states that the kindergarten is based on the fundamental values of Christian 
and humanistic heritage and traditions, combined with values that are expressed in 
different religions and philosophies and that are also clearly expressed in the 
Declaration of Human Rights. I argue that the objects clause can be understood as a 
form of “common ground strategy”. This can be seen as a possible unifying values 
base and a key strategy for future social integration, across cultural affiliations. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE NORWEGIAN CASE 
One of the greatest challenges facing modern-day secular states is how to integrate the 
seemingly increasing cultural diversity within society at large. In the space of a few 
decades, Norway, like most other Western countries, has become a multicultural 
society in which different cultures have to some extent either been interwoven with 
each other or live alongside each other. However, all societies are dependent on 
striking a balance between freedom and institutional control, in which case there will 
be a need to come up with integrating institutions that can promote integration 
through moral training in its broadest sense. In Norwegian society the intention is that 
kindergartens should play a key role in this training. The focus of this article is the 
Norwegian model, more specifically how the kindergartens' values base can be 
understood as a contribution towards integration in contemporary Norwegian society. 
The issue discussed is how it is possible to arrive at unifying values in a multicultural 
society that is characterised by secularisation and disintegration of the Christian 
hegemony of former times on the one hand and by the emergence of cultural and 
religious diversity on the other. This has to do with significant social changes, and the 
trend has accelerated in the post-war period. In this respect, many European countries 
have many features in common; support for churches and organised religion has 
weakened considerably during this period, at the same time as religious faith has 
become a more private and more individualised affair. This is also the case in 
Norway, even though the Norwegian state church system was not officially abolished 
until the summer of 2011. In practice, the Norwegian state has been secular for a long 
time, like other countries with which it is natural to compare, such as Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK (cf. section 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway; 
Schmidt 2010; Trägårdh 1997). Although it is unlikely that the Norwegian model, 
with its relatively strong state control, would have universal application, it could serve 
as an interesting case for further discussion on the role of the modern state in social 
integration.  
 
 
THE NORWEGIAN KINDERGARTEN AS AN INSTITUTION OF 
INTEGRATION 
In Norway it is established by law that a place in a kindergarten must be provided to 
all children who turn the age of one by no later than the end of August in the year in 
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which a place is applied for. The right to a place in kindergarten was introduced by 
the government on 1 January 2009 (Act no. 64 of 17 June 2005 relating to 
Kindergartens, section 12a). The state sponsoring of both public and private 
kindergartens is quite unique for Norway. Both gets almost full state funding except a 
relatively small maximum price parents pay for each child per month. At the end of 
2011, nearly 90 per cent of all children aged 1-5 years attended kindergarten, which is 
therefore a very important institution for integration and moral education in today’s 
multicultural Norway, even though the percentage of children with an immigrant 
background attending kindergarten is significantly lower.
i
 The need for social 
integration can hardly be said to be less than before. The kindergarten is a place 
where children with different religious, cultural and social backgrounds meet in order 
to be, among other things, culturally influenced and equipped for participating in 
cultural and civic life, including getting state sponsored moral education. And 
Norway certainly benefits from being a rich country which makes such sponsoring 
possible.  
 
Norwegian public institutions have traditionally been rooted in Christian values, but 
this has proved increasingly problematic in recent years, in line with the fact that a 
steadily declining proportion of the population has clear Christian affiliations (cf. 
Botvar and Schmidt (eds.) 2010). Norway’s Constitution is based on 
parliamentarianism, which gives the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) authority over 
the executive branch (the ministerial Government). The parliament provides amends 
and repeals the statutes by which society is ruled. The Constitution states that the 
legislative power is exercised through the Storting. In practice, however, the Storting 
delegates much of its power to the Government and government administration.  
 
In August 2010 a new objects clause for state kindergartens in Norway was 
introduced, 18 months after an almost identical clause was introduced for the schools. 
Approximately half of the kindergartens are state-owned and therefore obligated to 
comply with a common objects clause that is passed by the Norwegian parliament, 
whereas the private kindergartens are given the right to deviate from some of its 
provisions. The main reason for changing the provisions in the objects clause was the 
trend towards a more secularised, yet at the same time culturally diverse, society (cf. 
 4 
NOU 2007:6; Proposition to the Odelsting no. 47 (2007-2008)
ii
; Recommendaton to 
the Odelsting no. 18 (2008-2009)).  
 
The wording of the objects clause was approved already in December 2008 but did 
not come into force before the autumn of 2010 because the consequential 
amendments were not clarified before June of that year. These consequential 
amendments were incorporated into the regulations for the Kindergarten Act 
(Framework Plan) and, put briefly, state that private kindergartens may still choose 
not to comply with the paragraph referring to Christian and humanist heritage and 
traditions in the new objects clause. At the same time, it was emphasized that owners 
of private kindergartens and kindergartens owned or run by Church of Norway 
congregations could also continue to stipulate special provisions regarding 
philosophical purpose as a supplement to the current objects clause.
iii
 According to 
legislation, and in line with the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 
to which Norway has pledged itself, it is the parents/guardians that have the main 
responsibility for upbringing, not the kindergarten. This is stipulated in the following 
sections of the Declaration: Article 16: “The family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.” and 
Article 26: “Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be 
given to their children.” The private kindergartens' freedom to choose an alternative 
objects clause to that which applies for state kindergartens has empowered parents to 
choose kindergartens with alternative religious or philosophical values that are more 
in keeping with the education and values they want for their children. This was also 
specified in a legislative Bill concerning the Act relating to Amendments to the 
Kindergarten Act (On the Purpose of the Kindergarten), which reads as follows:  
 
 “Norway is bound by several international agreements (conventions) on 
 human rights. Particularly relevant to the objects clauses are the provisions in 
 these conventions regarding the specific content of education, the right of the 
 child to participation, non-discrimination, the right to freedom of thought, 
 conscience and religion, and respect for the rights of parents to ensure that 
 education and teaching comply with their own religious or philosophical 
 convictions.” (Proposition to the Odelsting no. 47 (2007-2008)).  
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This was incorporated into the new objects clause in connection with the amendments 
that were made in the summer of 2010 to the regulations for the kindergarten. 
 
Essentially, there is broad political consensus in Norway that the right of the parent 
must be protected, even if there is disagreement over where the opportunity to operate 
private kindergartens under an alternative objects clause stands in relation to this. 
Furthermore, the parental mandate implies that the parents' upbringing of their 
children, which will be influenced by various cultural factors including religious and 
philosophical affiliations and related understandings of reality, views of humanity, 
and values, should be supported in the kindergarten regardless of the background of 
the child. This was also explicitly expressed in the Framework Plan, with the 
following specification: “Cultural diversity must be reflected in the kindergarten.” 
(Framework Plan 2006:7). In this article, however, it is not the kindergartens' 
continued right to stipulate parts of their own values base that is the main focus of 
attention, even if this does provide significant and necessary background information 
for being able to understand the new objects clause. The focus of this article is on the 
different ways in which the new objects clause contained in the first paragraph of 
section 1 can be interpreted, with a view to offering a justified interpretation of its 
wording. The Christian values contained in the previous objects clause, as expressed 
in the wording “The kindergarten should help give children an upbringing in 
accordance with basic Christian values,” has now been replaced by the following, 
more detailed, wording: 
 
 “The Kindergarten shall be based on fundamental values in the Christian and 
humanist heritage and traditions, such as respect for human dignity and 
nature, intellectual freedom, charity, forgiveness, equality and solidarity, 
values which are also expressed in different religions and philosophies and 
which are rooted in human rights.” (Decision in the Odelsting no. 43 (2008-
2009); cf. Recommendation to the Odelsting no. 18 (2008-2009) and 
Proposition to the Odelsting no. 47 (2007-2008)). 
 
 
Nonetheless, there is a connection between parental rights and interpretation of the 
objects clause in that the kindergarten may not adopt a objects clause that does not 
protect the rights of the parents to determine the content of their child's upbringing. 
Along with other countries, Norway has pledged to uphold human rights as they are 
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defined in international conventions, and these have been incorporated into 
Norwegian legislation (cf. Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway, article 110c). On 
the basis of a prior understanding that the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor's 
thinking may have something to contribute towards an understanding of the objects 
clause for Norwegian kindergartens, I have formulated the following questions, which 
will be elucidated in this paper: Has the new objects clause meant that the 
kindergarten has acquired a secular values base? If so, what type of secularism could 
this be?  
 
 
SECULARISATION AT DIFFERENT LEVELS 
“Belief in God is no longer axiomatic. There are alternatives. And this will also likely 
mean that at least in certain milieux, it may be hard to sustain one's faith. There will 
be people who feel bound to give it up, even though they mourn its loss. This has 
been a recognizable experience in our societies, at least since the mid-nineteenth 
century.” Taylor writes this in his broadly conceived historical presentation in A 
Secular Age from 2007 (Taylor 2007: 3) . This quotation can be linked to two 
concepts which together express key features of the developments which Norwegian 
society, like many other Western countries, has undergone during the post-war period.  
 
Firstly, the quotation can be linked to the concept of secularisation, a social process 
whereby religion and religious institutions gradually lose their dominant role in 
society when it comes to expressing collective beliefs in the broadest sense of the 
word, defining values, and contributing towards forming the identity of the individual. 
Taylor links his understanding of secularisation to the classical expression of a 
secularisation thesis such as that found in Peter Berger's book The Sacred Canopy , 
which was first published in 1967 (Berger 1990). This secularisation thesis deals with, 
among other things, a marginalisation of the influence of religion on public 
institutions in society, which no longer seek religious legitimacy, at the same time as 
religion is being relegated from the public to the private sphere. Secondly, 
secularisation has also occurred at the individual level in that religious understandings 
of reality now have less significance for a growing number of people.  
Taylor distinguishes between three forms of secularity resulting from the 
secularisation described by Berger and religious sociologists. The classical 
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secularisation thesis has since been considerably toned down, not least by Berger 
himself (cf. Berger 1999). This mostly applies to secularisation at the individual level. 
With regard to the issue of secularisation at the level of public institutions, this is still 
maintained to a large extent in today's research into the sociology of religion. 
iv
 
Taylor's term for secularisation at society level in A Secular Age is Secularity 1, while 
secularisation at individual level is referred to as Secularity 2 (Taylor 2007:2-20). 
Thus far Taylor's thinking adds nothing new, a fact of which he is of course aware. 
What is new, as we will soon see, is the category he calls Secularity 3. 
 
CULTURAL PLURALISATION AND SECULARITY 3 
The quotation by Taylor cited above can also be linked to another cultural analytical 
concept, namely cultural pluralisation. Parallel with the secularisation of key public 
institutions, Norwegian society has in recent decades transformed from a relatively 
culturally homogeneous society into a multicultural society in which different cultures 
partly co-exist and partly are interwoven. This is particularly reflected in the fact that 
Norway today has a significant proportion of people with backgrounds from non-
Western countries, particularly in the largest cities. In Oslo, for example, 
approximately every fourth inhabitant has an immigrant background. As per 1 
January 2009, Norway's immigrant population accounted for 11 per cent of the total 
population, or just over 500,000 people, with backgrounds from more than 200 
different countries. By immigration population here is meant individuals with two 
foreign-born parents. Approximately two thirds of these have backgrounds from non-
Western countries, of which approximately half came to Norway as refugees. By 
comparison, in 1950 only 1.4 per cent of the population was born abroad 
(http://www.ssb.no/innvandring/).   
 
According to Taylor, it would be difficult in today's society not to realise that there 
are alternatives to one's own religious and philosophical conceptions. This applies just 
as much to fundamental existential questions as to questions of how we justify our 
choice of values. Our realisation that others think differently to us, also when it comes 
to fundamental existential questions and questions to do with values, will lead many 
of us to question our own way of thinking or perhaps make us open and inquisitive 
about how others view their lives. Viewed in this light, this has to do with radical 
changes in our empirical universe from the 1500s up to the present day (cf. Taylor 
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2007:11; Repstad 2008:322). It is this observation which Taylor associates with the 
concept of Secularity 3, and this concept can therefore be said to point to an 
interesting connection between cultural pluralisation and secularisation.  
 
The title of the book A Secular Age can also be directly tied in with the concept of 
Secularity 3, since the awareness that it is fully possible to subscribe to alternative 
religious and philosophical conceptions is precisely what Taylor has in mind when he 
says that those of us living in modern Western society are living in a secular age.
v
 
This also brings us to an essential point in this part of Taylor's philosophy: according 
to him, this awareness of the existence of alternatives to our world view unites us 
across religious and philosophical affiliations and represents a form of shared 
experience to which it is possible to subscribe in the search for a common, socially 
integrated, cultural framework. Or put more simply: an awareness of diversity 
suggests the necessity to also have something in common. 
 
 
TAYLOR'S TYPOLOGY OF SECULARISM 
We have already touched on Taylor's concepts of three different forms of secularity 
that represent a kind of temporary standstill in the secularisation process undergone 
by the West. It may seem a little confusing, but Taylor has also used the concept of 
secularism in connection with related topics in other accounts (Taylor 1999; Taylor 
2009). The concept of secularisation is not easy to grasp. It is often used polemically, 
as something one is either for or against, and there is no agreement in scholarly 
accounts as to how the concept should be understood (cf. Bangstad 2008). A more 
popularised way of putting it is that the concept of secularism can be said to refer to a 
normative line of thought or ideology. We could perhaps say that secularisation is a 
position where a normative viewpoint of the abovementioned secularisation is 
adopted and offers a positive judgement of it. Based on this understanding of the 
concept, a secularist would be a person who welcomes secularisation. Such a sketchy 
definition of the concept brings us closer to an understanding of the concept of 
secularism that can also be found in everyday speech.  
 
Taylor undertakes a more precise definition of his account of the concept when he 
presents a typology of secularism in his article entitled “Modes of Secularism” from 
 9 
1999. Here Taylor draws a distinction between two main types of strategy on which to 
base the concept of secularism. He calls the first of these strategies the common 
ground strategy. This is a strategy that emphasizes peaceful coexistence and political 
order. Today this can be linked to natural law and to a political doctrine that 
emphasizes human rights or constitutional rights (Taylor 1999:33). The idea is that 
these rights could make it possible to agree on normative values in a multicultural 
society, across religious or philosophical affiliations. Moreover, this could be 
achieved without this affiliation being regarded as irrelevant for public life and 
politics and without one particular religion or philosophical tradition becoming 
dominant. Such a soft secularism supports state neutrality with respect to different 
religions and their practitioners, with an appropriate divide between state and 
religion/Church.  
 
Taylor calls the other strategy the independent political ethic strategy (Taylor 
1999:33). This strategy requires the state to distance itself from all forms of religion 
and to refrain from giving religious expressions any form of official status. Such 
secularism could be criticised for representing a world view which in itself is based 
on a secular, tentatively empirically-based understanding of reality, or an anti-
religious ideology, depending on what kind of vocabulary is associated with it when 
criticism is raised. It would be possible to show a connection between the strategies 
for establishing the concept of secularism in such a way that those who can be 
described as philosophical secularists would most probably also want secularism 
understood as a political doctrine to have an impact on all of society's public 
institutions. This could lead to the risk of secularism becoming the dominant 
philosophical tradition at the expense of others. On the other hand, it would be 
possible to claim that secularism as a political doctrine could be expedient, without 
any philosophical or ideological consequences being drawn.  
 
To contextualize Taylor’s typology further, it could be linked to the discussion in 
meta-ethics whether moral facts are given, and if it’s possible to have knowledge of 
such facts or not. Simply said, on the one hand we have the cognitivists who argue 
that such moral facts exist and could be acknowledged, and on the other hand the non-
cognitivists who deny this. The non-cognitivists claim that morality is not objective 
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and does not have a foothold in any kind of independent reality (cf. Marturano 2005). 
Taylor’s common ground strategy could be linked to a form of culturalist moral 
realism, as Arto Laitinen pointed out with reference to earlier works of Taylor 
(Laitinen 2002. Cf. Taylor 1985, Taylor 1989). It could be argued that expressions of 
values grounded in different cultures can be situated without leading to relativism. 
This could certainly be of interest in the discussion of common values in a 
multicultural society, while trying to find a way of peaceful co-existence across 
cultural and religious affiliations. Taylor’s position is a form of value based moral 
realism concerning the ontology of values on phenomenological grounds. A detailed 
discussion of this topic is outside the scope of this essay since the focus here is on 
Taylor’s typology of secularism as an analytical framework. 
 
In any case, taking Taylor as our basis, we have outlined a two-pronged typology of 
secularism with two ideal types that help us in our understanding of what secularism 
is, even though he does not use the terms “soft” and “hard”. There is also a need for 
caution here. We have now looked at Taylor's three types of secularity that are linked 
to three different aspects of the result of the change process which secularisation 
represents. The concept of secularism is normatively charged, but Taylor's typology 
of secularism also has a descriptive, analytical aim, since he uses these to give a better 
understanding of what secularism entails rather than take a standpoint on the types of 
secularism per se. 
 
 
NEW OBJECTS CLAUSE – BREAK OR CONTINUITY? 
If we return to the kindergarten, it becomes apparent that by referring to Taylor's three 
types of secularity we can understand the objects clause as an attempt to respond to 
the results of secularisation in all shapes and forms. As already mentioned, the 
significance of Christianity in Norwegian society has diminished, regardless of how it 
is measured, and, parallel with this secularisation, Norway has become a multicultural 
society. The introduction of a new objects clause for the kindergarten can be 
understood on the background of this social trend, as it would have been difficult and 
perhaps undesirable to maintain a objects clause rooted in Christian values in a 
society characterised by secularism and multiculturalism. With reference to Taylor's 
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three types of secularity, the amendment to the objects clause can be interpreted as an 
expression of secularisation at the level of public institutions (Secularity 1), while 
parental rights and human rights place clear constraints on any desire that the 
kindergarten should contribute to secularisation at individual level (Secularity 2). On 
the contrary; parental rights lean towards respect for religious and philosophical 
diversity, where the objects clause can be interpreted as an expression of an 
awareness of this diversity (Secularity 3). 
 
It will of course be the case that the wording of the objects clause can be read in 
different ways. First of all, it can be read as a list of values that are rooted in equally 
ranked religious and philosophical traditions (including human rights), as Helje 
Kringlebotn Sødal has postulated (Sødal 2009:19). Based on this interpretation, in 
practice this would mean that the values that should apply in the kindergarten would 
be the values that are common to those religious and philosophical traditions, like a 
kind of values-based lowest common multiple. As it is extremely difficult to arrive at 
such a lowest common multiple on the basis of the different religions and 
philosophical traditions, it would be obvious to understand human rights as an 
expression of this lowest common multiple, something which in practice may lead to 
these being understood as elevated above the other religious and philosophical 
traditions. Or put more simply: the new objects clause will in practice be understood 
to the effect that the kindergarten should be based on the values that are common to 
the abovementioned religious and philosophical traditions as long as these comply 
with human rights. Such an emphasis on common values across cultural, religious and 
philosophical convictions, combined with an emphasis on human rights as an 
expression of general values, clearly point in the direction of Taylor's first type of 
secularism, common ground secularism, or what I have referred to as soft secularism. 
Correspondingly, if understood in this way, the objects clause could contribute to 
protecting the religious and philosophical diversity which Taylor ties in with the 
concept of Secularity 3. In this way parental rights could also be respected. 
 
Alternatively, the wording of the objects clause could be interpreted in such a way 
that emphasis is placed on positioning the wording “fundamental values in the 
Christian and humanist heritage and traditions” at the beginning of the clause. This 
can be interpreted to mean that the traditions that are mentioned first are considered to 
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be more important than the traditions that are referred to as “different religions and 
philosophies” and human rights. A key premise for such an understanding is also 
given in and through the wording of the previous objects clause, and on the basis of 
an assumption that there was perhaps a lack of political will to introduce radical 
changes. Such an understanding therefore means that continuity in relation to the 
previous objects clause for the kindergarten is emphasized, and that the order of the 
elements in the new version of the clause is considered to be more significant than 
their content, perhaps at the expense of grammatical constraints. It seems therefore 
clear that if we take such an understanding of the objects clause in the Kindergartens 
Act as our basis, we are far removed from both of Taylor's types of secularism. It is 
more a case of rhetorical concealment whereby some words have been replaced but 
otherwise everything is as it was. Such a reading implies an assertion that the objects 
clause does not take into account any of Taylor's categories of secularity, something 
which would also imply that parental rights are set aside.  
 
In my opinion it is Sødal's reading that is most relevant. The reason that can be given 
for this is that the first part of the sentence is to be understood as a preliminary 
affirmation of what type of religious and philosophical traditions the kindergarten 
should be based on: “The Kindergarten shall be based on fundamental values in the 
Christian and humanist heritage and traditions,”. Then comes the phrase “such as”, 
which signals that it has to do with a list of specifics of what the initial wording 
entails, after a comma: “respect for human dignity and nature, on intellectual freedom, 
charity, forgiveness, equality and solidarity”. Following this list of what kinds of 
values are associated with the Christian and humanist traditions comes a more precise 
definition, after a new comma: “values that are also expressed in different religions 
and beliefs and are rooted in human rights.” Here it is specified that the values 
mentioned in the first sentence are also expressed in “different” religions and 
philosophies, in addition to human rights. The listed values are not regarded as 
exclusively linked to the Christian and humanistic traditions, just as the objects clause 
does not favour exclusively Christian and humanistic values at the expense of the 
traditions that are referred to in the vaguely formulated “different religions and 
philosophies”.  
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A PLATFORM OF COMMON VALUES? 
The new objects clause will hardly lead to a revolution in the kindergarten's 
promotion of values. Nor was the previous Christian objects clause one that attempted 
to preach Christianity. Guidelines were set to interpret the link to Christianity in the 
previous objects clause as an introduction to Christian values, with the justification 
that this had traditionally been a cultural and therefore values-based framework to 
which the majority of the Norwegian population could subscribe. In other words, it 
should align with the prevailing interpretation of the previous objects clause for the 
kindergarten, where the wording “The kindergarten shall help provide children with 
an upbringing that is in accordance with fundamental Christian values” should, in 
accordance with the guidelines in the framework plan valid at the time when the 
objects clause was adopted, be interpreted in line with the following definition in the 
Framework Plan: 
 
“The Kindergarten Act prescribes that upbringing in the kindergarten must be 
in accordance with fundamental Christian values. This means that the 
kindergarten must base its activities on the ethical values that are rooted in 
Christianity and that are assumed to be widely supported by the inhabitants 
of Norway.” (Framework Plan 2006:9). 
 
 
Naturally, the reference to Christian and humanistic traditions in the new objects 
clause signals a certain degree of continuity between the two versions of the objects 
clauses, but in my opinion, and in support of Sødal, it is difficult to deny that the 
amendment effectively represents a break in the sense that it formalises a values base 
other than the exclusively Christian. There is therefore no getting away from the fact 
that a secularist mentality has gained more ground in the kindergarten through the 
adoption of the new objects clause, even if this comes about in a rather undramatic 
way. A form of soft secularism could then become a unifying values base for the 
kindergarten of the future, regardless of cultural affiliation. The other category of 
secularism, referred to here as hard secularism, would be unacceptable from the 
perspectives of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and human rights, since 
such secularism would be more intolerant of other religious and philosophical 
traditions than would one specific secular philosophical tradition. Or to put it another 
way: the kindergarten's new secularist values base can be seen to allow for the 
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promotion of both secular and religious values in the kindergarten of the future. In 
this connection, the kindergarten could perhaps prove to be an integrating institution 
in the best sense of the term. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
i
 At the end of 2011, nearly 90 per cent of all children aged 1-5 years attended kindergarten. Since 
2009, the proportion of children aged 3-5 years has been almost unchanged and was 96.5 per cent in 
2011. Similarly, the proportion of children aged 1-2 years increased by 2.3 percentage points and was 
79.5 per cent at the end of 2011. For children aged 1-5, 89.7 per cent attended kindergartens. This was 
an increase of 1.2 percentage points from 2010. At the end of 2011, 30 500 children from linguistic and 
cultural minorities attended kindergarten. A total of 57.3 per cent of children aged 0-5 with an 
immigrant background attended kindergarten. (http://www.ssb.no/barnehager_en/). 
 
ii
 The Odelsting is a historical term for one of the two chambers in the Norwegian Parliament (the other 
was called the Lagting). A proposition to the Odelsting was a legislative Bill sent by the Government to 
the Odelsting for consideration. The system of two chambers was abolished as of 1 October 2009. 
Propositions to the Odelsting have now been replaced by Propositions to the Storting (the Norwegian 
Parliament) 
(http://www.stortinget.no/Global/pdf/Hovedbrosjyre%20div%20spraak/2009_eng_web.pdf.) 
iiiCf. the decision regarding amendments to the Kindergarten Act, section 1a: Special purpose: “The 
new section 1a shall read as follows: Owners of private kindergartens are at liberty to decide that the 
values referred to in section 1 of the Act shall not be based on the Christian or humanist heritage and 
traditions. In their statutes, private kindergartens and kindergartens owned or run by congregations 
within the Church of Norway may stipulate special provisions in their statutes regarding religious or 
philosophical purpose. http://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-
publikasjoner/Vedtak/Beslutninger/Lovvedtak/2009-2010/vedtak-200910-059/#a1(18.10.2010). A 
summary of Norwegian research on kindergartens is given in Alvestad et al. (2009). Relevant research 
in connection with the objects clause for the kindergarten can be found in Lindboe (2007), Østrem 
(2008), and Sødal (2009). The most important study on the promotion of values and the place of 
religion in the kindergarten is still the teacher of religious education Sturla Sagberg's doctoral 
dissertation Autentisitet og undring [Authenticity and Wonder] from 2001 (Sagberg (2001)).  
 
iv
 The processes of secularisation are complex and there are varieties from between countries based on 
differences in cultural and social contexts (cf. Berger, P. et al. (2008) and Berger (ed.)(1999)).  
 
v
The connection to Taylor's theory of secularisation is made on the basis that Taylor has stood as a 
central secularisation theorist in the West in recent decades and has published a number of publications 
in this field. There are of course alternatives to Taylor, such as the theories developed by Habermas 
and Asad, the latter of whom criticised Taylor for being overly Western-oriented in his understanding 
of the concept of secularisation (cf. Bangstad 2009:51-96). 
